

















Seeing-in, figurativity, inflection, trompe-l’oeils, naturalistic pictures, unconscious pictures






In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation of the properties by which a certain subject is seen in a given picture as having refers to the design properties of the picture’s vehicle, i.e., to the visible surface properties of that vehicle that are responsible for the fact that one such subject is seen in it, precisely taken in such a design role. Finally, I will try to show that seeing-in is qualified by inflection independently of whether it is conscious or unconscious (in the sense of subpersonal) seeing-in.
The architecture of the paper is as follows. In Section 1, I will try to rescue Wollheim’s thesis from some old and new criticisms centered on genuine trompe l’oeils and naturalistic pictures as eliciting putative counterexamples to the thesis. In Section 2, I will focus on Bence Nanay’s amendment of Wollheim’s position that is meant to deal in a different way with the above putative counterexamples. According to such an amendment, seeing-in indeed is the mark of figurativity yet it comes in two varieties, inflected – typically, in the cases of pictures that attract us for the refined character of their design – and uninflected – typically, in the particular cases of genuine trompe l’oeils and naturalistic pictures. I will try to show that this is not the case, for genuine trompe l’oeils elicit no seeing-in at all while naturalistic pictures elicit merely pseudo-uninflected seeing-in. Finally in Section 3, I will try to counter a possible reply by Nanay centered on the case of unconsciously seen pictures. I will try to show that, even granted that such pictures elicit unconscious seeing-in, this seeing-in is still inflected. 

1. Seeing-in as responsible for figurativity

One of Wollheim’s most famous theses is that the mental state he labelled “seeing-in” is the mark of figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. In other terms, for Wollheim if a representation does not elicit a seeing-in experience for a suitable spectator (i.e., a spectator who stands in an appropriate position to perceive the representation and is endowed with the proper capacities to grasp its pictorial value), it is not a figurative picture, a depiction.​[1]​ In his account, seeing-in is a phenomenologically sui generis experience made by two inseparable folds: (i) the configurational fold, the direct and literal perception of the picture in its materiality, i.e., the picture’s vehicle, and (ii) the recognitional fold, the indirect and nonliteral perception of the picture’s subject, i.e., what is depicted in the picture. The latter fold can be considered the proper ‘seeing-in’ fold, insofar as it justifies our commonsensical saying that we see a certain subject in a picture.​[2]​
	Not only people against any perceptualist account of figurativity, but also people who acknowledge that figurativity has to do with an experiential or at least a cognitive factor have criticised the idea that seeing-in is necessary for something to be a figurative picture. First of all, Michael Newall has recently maintained that the experiential state that marks figurativity is not seeing-in, but it is rather an experience of illusory seeing-as. For there are representations that involve no seeing-in experience which however are pictures pretty much as those involving the seeing-in experiences, insofar as they involve an experience of illusory seeing-as. First of all, consider genuine trompe l’oeils. By “genuine trompe l’oeils” I mean pictures that fool one’s eye insofar as they are simply taken as the subjects they represent.​[3]​ If genuine trompe l’oeils really fool one’s eye, they cannot be accompanied by a twofold seeing-in experience. In order for such an illusion to take place, the picture’s vehicle must not be experienced. Rather, the experience surrounding a genuine trompe l’oeil simply is an illusory experience in which one seems to see the picture’s subject, or better (to tell such an experience from a mere hallucination of that subject) one sees the picture’s vehicle as that subject. Moreover, consider naturalistic pictures, a very broad kind of pictures that covers both the sophisticated paintings in which an experiencer is caught up by the very subtle and realistic details of the representation – such as e.g. Jan Van Eyck’s The Arnolfini Portrait – and ordinary pictures such as postcards and snapshots (including sexually moving pictures such as pornographic images​[4]​). Naturalistic pictures do not certainly fool us. Yet according to Newall they prompt no seeing-in experience as well, for in them the experiencer focuses her attention merely on the picture’s subject. Once again, like genuine trompe l’oeils, the experience surrounding them is the illusory experience of seeing the picture’s vehicle as the picture’s subject. Yet, unlike genuine trompe l’oeils, such an experience is recognised as such (as in any optical illusion such as e.g. the Müller-Lyer illusion). In this perspective, figurative pictures eliciting a proper twofold seeing-in experience are just those pictures that, over and above being (knowingly illusorily) experienced as their subjects, also prompt an aware experience of their vehicle.​[5]​ More radically, Dominic Lopes has maintained that the cognitive factor affecting figurativity merely is the recognition of the picture’s subject.​[6]​ Such a recognition may take place without any experience of the picture’s vehicle, as in trompe l’oeils again. If both the pictorial experience mobilised by the trompe l’oeils cases and the one mobilised by the normal cases share a recognitional experiential component, this is the experience the relevant experiencer has as of the picture’s subject, the mere experience of seeming to see that subject. Yet one such recognition may also occur without any experience at all, as in pictures apprehended as such by individuals having no conscious experience of them. For instance, eminegligent subjects perceptually yet unconciously pick up figurative pictures located in the left-hand side of their visual space, as their behaviour shows.​[7]​
	In the remaining part of this Section, I will try to show that neither genuine trompe l’oeils nor naturalistic pictures constitute real counterexamples to Wollheim’s thesis. Let me start with genuine trompe l’oeils. As is well known, Wollheim himself rejected the ‘trompe l’oeils‘- case as a counterexample to his thesis. If trompe l’oeils elicit no twofold seeing-in, he said, they are not figurative pictures.​[8]​ This reply has always been taken to be rather ad hoc. Yet to my mind it can be fully justified once it is grounded in the ideas, first, that only trompe l’oeils recognised as such count as figurative pictures, and second, that figurative pictures have to be seen as such in order to count as depictions of their subjects.
	To begin with, from an experiential point of view there is a big difference between a trompe l’oeil that fools one’s eyes and a trompe l’oeil that is recognised as such. For, while in the former case the trompe l’oeil is effectively surrounded merely by an unknowingly illusory experience of seeing the picture’s vehicle as the picture’s subject, in the latter case it is surrounded by a proper twofold seeing-in experience. In fact, recognising the trompe l’oeil as such amounts not only to entertaining an illusory – yet this time knowingly – experience of seeing the picture’s vehicle as the picture’s subject, but also to entertaining the experience of seeing the vehicle itself. Indeed, such a recognition is induced by noticing features in the surrounding environment (frames, signatures, walls …) that allow the experience of seeing the vehicle as such to arise and thereby flank the illusory experience. But then – putting things in Newall’s own terms – having both such experiences amounts to entertaining a proper twofold experience marked both by a recognitional and by a configurational fold. Thus, once the trompe l’oeil is so recognised as such, it precisely counts as a figurative picture insofar as it is surrounded by a proper twofold experience.​[9]​
	Yet on behalf of Wollheim’s critics one may object, why should only trompe l’oeils recognised as such count as figurative pictures? Is this not an ad hoc move once again? Moreover, doesn’t this move make a figurative picture something too subjective, insofar as its being a depiction depends on that recognition – what if a perceiver no longer recognized a trompe l’oeil as such, would it no longer be a figurative picture? 
	My reply to this objection is two-stepped. First of all, three-dimensional cases of trompe l’oeils show that only trompe l’oeils recognised as such count as figurative pictures. Consider manikins and puppets, which I take as the paradigmatic cases of three-dimensional trompe l’oeils. When do they work as figurative pictures? Undoubtedly, only when they are recognised as manikins and puppets, that is, only when they are no longer erroneously taken as humans or as animals respectively. A manikin is the figurative picture of a human only once it is recognised as a manikin, that is, only when it no longer deceives people in being erroneously taken as a human. Analogously with a puppet. Yet being recognised as a manikin (or as a puppet) precisely amounts for a manikin (a puppet) to be surrounded with a twofold seeing-in experience, in which the (this time knowingly illusory) experience of seeing the manikin as a human (the puppet as an animal) is flanked by the experience of seeing the manikin (the puppet) itself. Now, with two-dimensional trompe l’oeils it happens precisely the same as with manikins and puppets, i.e., three-dimensional trompe l’oeils. That is, two-dimensional trompe l’oeils count as figurative pictures only once they are recognised as such, i.e., they are surrounded by a proper twofold seeing-in experience.
	To be sure, one may wonder whether three-dimensional items are genuine cases of figurative pictures. Some people hold that sculptures and two-dimensional pictures exhibit their representational value in different ways; if the latter are pictorial representations, this does not entail that the former are also such.​[10]​ So, we need a more general justification as to why only trompe l’oeils recognised as such count as figurative pictures. Moreover, such a justification has to remove the halo of subjectivity that appealing to recognition of a trompe l’oeil as such spreads over figurativity.
	Here comes my second step. The justification I am looking for is provided by the general fact that in order for something to count as a figurative picture, it must be seen as such. This is patently shown in the cases of so-called puzzle pictures and of what I want to call ‘aspect dawning’- pictures. Puzzle pictures are those drawings in which, only once a certain pattern is completed – typically, by linking some points through a continuous line – a certain figure emerges, say a cat or a turtle. ‘Aspect dawning’- pictures are instead those patterns that have to be seen in a particular way in order for a figure to emerge in them. Consider the famous picture of a dalmatian Lopes recalls in several occasions.​[11]​ For a long while, by looking at the relevant sketch one is only able to grasp a series of black and white spots in it. Yet all of sudden, a certain aspect dawns: by focalising a certain contour surrounding some of the spots, a certain figure emerges in the sketch, namely, the figure of a dalmatian. In both cases, the pictures involved do not count as figurative pictures until they are recognised as such, that is, until they are seen as such by letting certain figures emerge in them as their subjects (via a physical or a phenomenological completion of the picture’s vehicle). But, as Wollheim himself originally understood,​[12]​ for such pictures – indeed, for any picture – to be seen as pictures precisely amounts to entertaining a certain twofold seeing-in experience as regards them. In such an experience – to put again things in Newall’s terms – while seeing the picture’s vehicle (or better, in virtue of seeing the vehicle), one precisely sees that vehicle as the picture’s subject. Moreover, such an experience has no halo of subjectivity. For it is not reversible. Once one grasps the pictorial value of such a picture, one cannot go back to the experience one previously entertained when facing the picture; the phenomenology of one’s experience dramatically changes once for all.
So, in their being paradigmatic as to what makes something count as a figurative picture, puzzle pictures and ‘aspect dawning’- pictures show why only trompe l’oeils recognised as such count as figurative pictures. For unlike trompe l’oeils not recognised as such, they are surrounded by a twofold seeing-in experience. Such an experience, moreover, guarantees that once one recognises a trompe l’oeil as such, one cannot go back to one’s previous illusory experience of it. So, not even this recognition is marked by a halo of subjectivity. To be sure, one may still focus merely on the recognitional fold of the seeing-in experience one now entertains with respect to a trompe l’oeil recognised as such. Yet such a focus does not prevent the other fold from being focalised as well. 
	Once trompe l’oeils are treated in the above way, it is also easy to see why, pace Newall, not even naturalistic pictures count as counterexamples to Wollheim’s theory, as Wollheim himself originally envisaged.​[13]​ Granted, naturalistic pictures are seen as figurative pictures, they do not fool the eye. But since they are seen as such, they count as depictions like any other figurative picture, that is, by being surrounded by a twofold seeing-in experience. In point of fact, pace Newall there is a difference between a typical illusory experience known as such, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion, and the knowingly illusory experience of a picture’s vehicle as the picture’s subject. In the former case, knowing that the experience is illusory has no phenomenal import. In the Müller-Lyer case, for instance, one may well know that the two segments have the same length; yet one is forced to see them as being different in length precisely in the same way as when one had no such knowledge. Yet in the latter case, knowing that the experience of seeing the picture’s vehicle as the picture’s subject is illusory, i.e., knowing that the vehicle of a naturalistic picture is not the picture’s subject, does have a phenomenal import. For one discovers the illusoriety of such an experience only insofar as one simultaneously has another visual experience, namely, the experience of seeing the picture’s vehicle. It is in virtue of seeing the vehicle that one acknowledges that seeing the picture as its subject is an illusory experience. Thus, the seeing of the vehicle cannot be put aside, as Wollheim’s critics would like. But this amounts to saying that (knowingly illusorily) experiencing a naturalistic picture is not merely seeing the picture’s vehicle as the picture’s subject, but rather is having the latter experience together with seeing the vehicle itself: that is, having a proper twofold seeing-in experience made by a recognitional as well as by a configurational fold. All in all, naturalistic pictures count as no counterexamples to Wollheim’s theory either .​[14]​ 
To be sure, there are further criticisms one can raise against Wollheim’s conception of seeing-in. Yet independently of whether one can successfully deal with them (as I believe), none of them is decisive against the role seeing-in plays in such a conception.​[15]​ Thus, seeing-in remains the mark of figurativity.

2. Qua responsible for figurativity, seeing-in is inflected

Recently, Nanay has performed a different move. To be sure, Nanay well endorses the Wollheimian thesis to the effect that seeing-in is the sui generis twofold mental state that affects all figurative pictures. Yet pace Wollheim, for Nanay twofoldness occurs in different ways, depending on whether the respective targets of the seeing-in folds – i.e., the picture’s vehicle and the picture’s subject – are experienced – the seeing-in entertainer is aware of them – or at least one of them, the picture’s vehicle, is merely (wholly or partially) represented – the seeing-in entertainer is not (utterly) aware of such a target, or of both. Moreover, he goes on saying, when both targets are experienced seeing-in is inflected, whereas when at least the picture’s vehicle is not experienced but merely (wholly or partially) represented, seeing-in is uninflected. As a result, Nanay accounts in a different way for the aforementioned alleged counterexamples to seeing-in as the distinctive pictorial experience, i.e., genuine trompe l’oeils and naturalistic pictures. Since in such cases the picture’s vehicle is, either wholly or partially, merely represented but not experienced, trompe l’oeils not recognised as such and naturalistic pictures count as situations that do mobilise seeing-in, yet as merely uninflected.​[16]​
	In order to fully understand Nanay’s move, one has of course to understand what is the phenomenon of inflection that affects seeing-in. Intuititively, inflection is the phenomenon according to which some at least of the seen features of the picture’s vehicle are somehow relevant in characterising features of the picture’s subject as seen in that vehicle. Yet, if one merely said that inflection points to the fact that certain seen properties of the picture’s vehicle influence the properties with which the picture’s subject is seen in the picture, one would risk to trivialise inflection as merely qualifying seeing-in per se.​[17]​ Thus, one has to properly understand how the former properties are relevant. Now, in the relevant literature from Michael Podro (1998) onwards, different characterisations of inflection have been provided. I here take that Robert Hopkins (2010) provides the most convincing one. According to Hopkins, seeing-in is inflected iff the properties by means of which a certain subject is seen in a picture are such that their characterisation refers to the design properties (conceived as such) of the picture’s vehicle.​[18]​ In its turn, this way of qualifying inflection traces back to Lopes’ (2005) distinction between merely visible surface properties and design properties of a picture’s vehicle.​[19]​ According to Lopes, in its surface a picture’s vehicle is affected by a host of visible properties. Some properties of this kind are responsible for the fact that a certain subject is seen in the picture: these are the design properties of the vehicle. Some other properties of this kind do not bear such a responsibility: these are the merely visible surface properties of the vehicle. Standard examples of the latter properties are properties that affect the material status of the vehicle’s surface: e.g. being cracked, being wooden, being opaque.​[20]​ Standard examples of the former properties are colours and shapes of the vehicle. Thus, inflection is qualified by the fact that conceived as such, i.e., in their proper role of being responsible for seeing-in, the design properties of the vehicle affect the characterisation of the properties with which the picture’s subject is seen in the picture. In the example provided by Hopkins, Rembrandt’s sketch of the pastor Jan Cornelisz Sylvius, the pastor is seen in the picture to have an ink-made hand. This characterisation of the property in question, that of being an ink-made hand, the picture’s subject is seen as having in the sketch refers to the fact that the property of being an ink sketch is responsible for the fact that a pastor with such a hand is seen in the sketch; in a nutshell, such a characterisation refers to a certain design property conceived as such of the vehicle.​[21]​
	If Rembrandt’s sketch is a typical example of inflected seeing-in, it may seem that, given such a dependence of the properties with which a picture’s subject is seen in the picture on the design properties (conceived as such) of the vehicle, inflection requires that the above properties cannot really belong to the picture’s subject – or, as Hopkins puts it, the subject cannot be seen face-to-face as having such properties.​[22]​ Of course, since a pastor’s hand is made of flesh, it is not ink-made, nor could it be; so, the pastor cannot be seen face-to-face as having that property, he is simply seen in the picture with that property. Also other characterisations of inflection precisely point towards this direction.​[23]​ 
However, it seems to me that Hopkins’ definition has no such requirement. There are cases of inflection in which the properties with which a picture’s subject is seen in the picture do belong to the picture’s subject, so that such a subject can also be seen face-to-face as having them. Consider e.g. Luigi Carlo’s painting The Girl in Golden Tan. In this picture, the fact that the picture is an oil painting determines the characterisation of the woman one sees in it with the properties of having an oily and levigated skin. We may well suppose that such a woman really has such properties, so that she may well be seen face-to-face as having them. Simply, her characterisation with such properties does not depend on the fact that one has directly seen that woman, but on the fact that the picture possesses the property of being oily. This is a design property conceived as such, for it is also responsible for the fact that such a subject is seen in the picture. Or, to take a fictitious example, imagine a Masaccio-style painting whose main character is King Midas’ daughter, who (as the legend says) has turned into gold, represented as being golden by means of a gold tempera.
To my mind, a possible reason as to why Hopkins’ definition of inflection is (erroneously) seen as having one such requirement is to prevent inflection from collapsing into mere overlap. Overlap is the case in which the properties a picture’s subject is seen in the picture as having match design properties of the picture’s vehicle, as when a scarlet robe is seen in a scarlet patch of a painting.​[24]​ Now, if properties that are visible in a picture were also properties its subject has when seen face-to-face, one would risk such a collapse. First of all, however, I certainly hold that overlap does not entail inflection. In the example I provided above with Carlo’s painting, there are other properties that the picture’s vehicle possesses and which are both visible in the picture and possessed by the picture’s subject when seen face-to-face; yet these properties are not imbued with inflection. For instance, the girl’s bikini is seen to be black in the painting and can be seen as such when one sees that girl face-to-face, while the canvas is black as well; yet it is not in virtue of the fact that the canvas is black that the girl is seen as having a black bikini in the picture (there is at most a mere causal influence). Moreover, even in cases in which both overlap and inflection occur, the two things do not coincide. In the above example, it is not simply the case that a pièce of oily skin of a girl that may be seen as oily when facing the girl is seen as oily in an oil painting. Rather, one sees as oily in the painting a skin that may be also seen face-to-face as oily in virtue of the fact that such a painting is oily. The characterisation as oily of such a skin one sees in the picture refers to the fact that such a picture’s being oily is responsible for the fact that such a skin is seen in that picture; hence, that characterisation refers to that design property of the picture in its design role. Thus, seeing a subject in a picture with a property imbued with inflection that subject may also be seen face-to-face as having does not make inflection collapse into overlap.
	We will soon see why it is important that Hopkins’ definition of inflection does not involve the above requirement that I find unwelcome. For the time being, let us see which lesson Nanay draws from the fact that there is inflected seeing-in. As I said, for him if at least the picture’s vehicle is, either wholly or partially, merely represented but not experienced, the resulting twofold mental state of seeing-in is uninflected. As I hinted at before, this is precisely the case of trompe l’oeils not recognised as such and of naturalistic pictures respectively. In the case of naturalistic pictures, the picture’s vehicle is merely partially represented but not experienced. For, unlike its merely visible surface properties, the design properties of such a vehicle are represented but not experienced (they are not seen in their design role). Hence, in such case seeing-in is uninflected. In the case of trompe l’oeils not recognised as such, the picture’s vehicle is wholly represented but not experienced. For not even its merely visible surface properties are experienced, though they are represented. Again then, also in such a case seeing-in is not inflected.​[25]​ Thus, seeing-in for Nanay accounts for figurativity as for Wollheim, but only insofar as it can be both inflected and uninflected.
	One may reconstruct Nanay’s line of argument as follows:

1)	If in seeing-in at least the picture’s vehicle is either wholly or partially merely represented but not experienced, then seeing-in is uninflected;
2)	There are cases of seeing-in in which at least the picture’s vehicle is either wholly or partially merely represented but not experienced (the cases of trompe l’oeils not recognised as such and of naturalistic pictures above all);
3)	Hence, there are cases of uninflected seeing-in.

To my mind, however, neither trompe l’oeils not recognised as such nor naturalistic pictures are cases of uninflected seeing-in, in the former case for such trompe l’oeils involve no seeing-in at all, in the latter case for naturalistic pictures involve only pseudo-uninflected seeing in, i.e., genuinely inflected seeing-in. Hence, I still hold that seeing-in accounts for figurativity, but only insofar as it is inflected. Let me explain.
	As I just said, I defend the thesis opposite to Nanay to the effect that neither trompe l’oeils not recognised as such nor naturalistic pictures are cases of uninflected seeing-in. This opposite thesis hinges on putting premise 2) in the above argument into question. Pace Nanay, at least in the problematic cases mobilised by genuine trompe l’oeils and naturalistic pictures respectively, the relevant surface properties that should be apprehended in the configurational fold of the alleged uninflected seeing-in are either not even represented or effectively experienced. 
To show that this is so, let me preliminarily go back to what I have taken to be the paradigmatic case of figurative pictures, in particular the case of ‘aspect-dawning’- pictures. In such a case, I have said before, in order for one such picture to count as a figurative picture one has to see it as such. In order to do that, moreover, one has to experience certain grouping properties of the picture’s vehicle, namely, the properties that group in a particular way some elements of the vehicle’s array – in the aforementioned example of the picture of a dalmatian, one has to experience those contours that group some black and white spots of the picture’s vehicle in a certain way.​[26]​ Yet to have that experience is precisely to experience some of the design properties of the picture’s vehicle, i.e., some of those visible surface properties of the vehicle that are responsible for the fact that a certain subject is seen in it. As the example of the picture of a dalmatian clearly shows, grouping properties are those among design properties that are responsible not only for the fact that a certain subject is seen in the picture, but also and more specifically for the emergence of such a subject in the picture’s vehicle. Yet once such an experience involving grouping properties occurs, as to an ‘aspect dawning’- picture there also is inflected seeing-in.​[27]​ For the subject that is seen in that picture is seen with properties that subject not only may be seen face-to-face as having, but whose characterisation also refers precisely to some of the design properties of the vehicle taken in their design role; namely, its grouping properties. In the case of the picture of a dalmatian, the dog is seen in the picture as having a certain shape, which may well be seen face-to-face as having and yet whose characterisation refers to the contour grouping properties of the picture’s vehicle taken in their design role, i.e., as explaining why one sees a dalmatian in the picture. 
This case shows why it is important that Hopkins’ definition of inflection fails to have the unwelcome aforementioned requirement. Paradigmatic figurative pictures are inflected insofar as, notwithstanding the fact that their subjects have certain properties when they are seen face-to-face, the fact that when also seen in the picture such subjects are characterised as having those very properties refers to the contour grouping properties of the picture’s vehicle taken in their design role.
To be sure, the above reasoning hinges on ranking grouping properties within design properties. One may however wonder whether this ranking is correct. Lopes has recently denied that grouping properties are design properties.​[28]​ For, he says, design properties have to be visible independently of seeing anything in the picture, whereas grouping properties can be visually grasped only after that one sees something in the picture. As a result, in the case of the picture of a dalmatian there is no real twofold experience of seeing-in, but just a pseudo-experience of that kind.​[29]​
Granted, grouping properties cannot be visually grasped independently of seeing something in a picture, for once one visually grasps them one also sees something in the picture. Yet Lopes’ independence requirement for design properties seems to me ungrounded. For, pace Lopes, the order of the explanation goes in the opposite direction: it is in virtue of visually grasping the grouping properties of a picture’s vehicle that one sees a certain subject in that vehicle, not the other way around. So, grouping properties are responsible as much as the ‘traditional’ design properties for the fact that a certain subject is seen in the picture. Simply, as I said before, unlike those other design properties they are also responsible for the fact that such a subject emerges in the picture. This is why one cannot see the grouping properties without also seeing the subject in the picture. To be sure, knowing that a certain subject can be seen in a picture facilitates a certain grouping operation on the picture’s vehicle to be performed. Yet such a knowledge does not show that it is in virtue of seeing something in a picture that one visually grasps the relevant grouping properties of the picture’s vehicle. For, as I have just said, the order of explanation rather goes in the opposite direction. So, grouping properties are thoroughly entitled to figure within the design properties of a picture’s vehicle. As a consequence, the seeing-in affecting an ‘aspect dawning’- picture is a genuine seeing-in. Besides and more importantly for my purposes, it is an inflected seeing-in. For, as we saw, certain properties a subject is seen in a picture as having refer for their characterisation to those grouping properties taken in their design role.​[30]​
Armed with these reflections, let us return to the problematic cases. In trompe l’oeils not recognised as such, neither their merely visible surface properties nor their design properties are experienced or even represented. Since such trompe l’oeils fool one’s eye, their experiencers erroneously and unknowingly take them as the objects they seem to see. Thus, the only properties they represent, as well as experience, are the properties they ascribe to such objects. All in all, therefore, in the case of a genuine trompe l’oeil there is no seeing-in at all, not even uninflected.​[31]​
Here one might immediately react: since in such a case one undoubtedly stands in a causal relationship not with the deluding object it is not there, but with the genuine trompe l’oeil one is facing, how can it be that one does not represent that trompe l’oeil’s properties, even if one experiences the properties of such an absent object? The answer seems easy: for even one’s behavioural responses mobilise the absent object rather than the trompe l’oeil. In order for someone to represent something even without experiencing it, her overall behaviour must be sensible to that something. 
To be sure, once a trompe l’oeil were recognised as such, it would be seen as a figurative picture. Yet at that point one would surely experience both its merely visible surface properties and at least those of its design properties that manage to prompt one to see its subject in it; primarily, its grouping properties. Since experiencing grouping properties forces one to see a subject in a picture as having properties whose characterisation refers to those grouping properties in their design role, the seeing-in affecting that trompe l’oeil would be inflected. 
Now, as far as naturalistic pictures are concerned, we are in the same boat as with trompe l’oeils recognised as such. We definitely see naturalistic pictures as figurative pictures. Yet this means that, over and above their merely visible surface properties, we also experience those design properties that prompt their subject to be seen in it; again, their grouping properties. To be sure, it may well be that some of the design properties of the picture’s vehicle appear not to be experienced. For example, when watching a soccer game in tv one does not notice the trapezoidal shape on the screen depicting the rectangular penalty area of the field.​[32]​ Yet first, one can definitely attend even the design properties that one seems not to experience – in the previous example, one can definitely attend to the trapezoidal shape on the screen, even if it was not previously focused. This shows that there was phenomenal awareness of such properties that simply went unnoticed (it is a case in which awareness precedes attention, as it were). Moreover, even if such design properties were really unexperienced, this does not mean that some other design properties of the vehicle are not experienced. As I just said, these are the vehicle’s grouping properties once again. Once cannot see a naturalistic picture as a figurative picture without experiencing such properties at least. Now, given the role that as we have seen grouping properties play, the seeing-in affecting naturalistic pictures is inflected as well. So all in all, the putative counterexamples to inflected seeing-in appear to have been dismantled. Qua responsible for the picture’s figurativity, seeing-in is inflected.

3. Unconsciously grasped pictures make no difference to inflection

Quite likely, Nanay would reply to the above as follows. First of all, even if one puts into brackets whether as regards trompe l’oeils not recognised as such and naturalistic pictures the picture’s vehicle is experienced and not (wholly or partially) merely represented, he stresses that there certainly are other cases in which such a vehicle is merely represented. These are the cases in which also the picture’s subject is merely represented as well: namely, the cases in which pictures are unconsciously grasped as such. Typically (but not exhaustively), these are the already recalled cases displayed by eminegligent patients that grasp the pictorial value of what they are facing in the left-hand side of their visual space although they have no awareness of such a grasp (they indeed say that they perceive nothing, or nothing relevant, in that side). Thus, he comments, there definitely are cases in which twofold seeing-in occurs in a non-experiential modality, as premise 2) of the above argument states.​[33]​
	Moreover, Nanay seems to provide a further argument in favour of premise 1) of the above argument, namely the claim that if at least the picture’s vehicle in a twofold mental state of seeing-in is merely represented and not experienced, then such a seeing-in is uninflected. First of all, he agrees with many cognitive scientists that in humans at least, object perception results from two components. The first component has to do with object identification, which allows one to tell one object from the other objects surrounding it and thus to identify it. The second component is a motion-guiding component, which enables one to physically grasp that object by giving the peripheral areas of our motion system the right grasping commands. Notoriously, these components are implemented in different visual areas of the human brain. The first implementation takes the ventral pathway, for it goes from the occipital lobe to the temporal lobe of the brain, while the second implementation takes the dorsal pathway, which goes from the occipital lobe to the frontal lobe through the parietal lobe.​[34]​ Moreover, Nanay goes on saying, it has also been shown that in the more ordinary cases of conscious pictorial vision, the identification component is mobilised twice, that is, both with respect to the picture’s vehicle and with respect to the picture’s subject – in such a perception we identify both items – while the motion-guiding component is mobilised only with respect to the picture’s vehicle – we can ideally grasp the canvas we are facing, but we do not even attempt at grasping the subject we see in it, for we know it is not there.​[35]​ Yet, adds Nanay, with respect to cases of unconscious pictorial vision such as the ones eminegligent patients mobilise, while the motion-guiding component remains active only with respect to the picture’s vehicle, as in conscious pictorial vision, unlike conscious pictorial vision the identification component acts only with respect to the picture’s subject – no attempt to tell the vehicle from its surroundings is provided. Incidentally, Nanay maintains that no perceptual identification component at least for the design properties of the vehicle is active also with respect to the less ordinary cases of conscious pictorial vision, i.e., trompe l’oeils not recognised as such and naturalistic pictures.​[36]​ In any case, for Nanay, this predicament shows that there is a perceptual difference in the cases of ordinary conscious pictorial vision and unconscious pictorial vision respectively. Such a difference accounts for the fact that while in ordinary conscious pictorial vision if both targets of the seeing-in folds are experienced then seeing-in is inflected, in unconscious pictorial vision if both targets are merely represented then seeing-in is uninflected, as premise 1) of the above argument states.​[37]​ So, Nanay may say, premise 1) is warranted. If as we have seen above also premise 2) were warranted, Nanay would be legimated in concluding that the above argument is sound and in therefore holding that there really is uninflected seeing-in.
To be sure, the idea that there is something like unconscious pictorial vision may sound controversial: is there a real evidence – for instance, some pièce of discriminating behaviour – showing that people unconsciously facing figurative pictures really grasp them as such, rather than unconsciously mistaking them as their subjects?
Nevertheless, let me accept that there really is such a vision. For one thing, if eminegligent patients and similar people unconsciously mistook pictures as their subjects, not only the identificative component of their unconscious perceptual states would be directed towards such subjects rather than to the pictures’ vehicles, but also the motor-guiding component would be so directed. Unconscious pictorial vision, therefore, makes premise 2) of Nanay’s argument ultimately defensible.
However, note first that if the difference between ordinary pictorial vision conscious and unconscious pictorial vision were linked to the different work Nanay claims the identification component does in those cases – to be directed both at the picture’s subject and at the picture’s vehicle in the former case, only at the subject in the latter case – this difference would corroborate my previous treatment of trompe l’oeils not recognised as such and of naturalistic pictures as involving no seeing-in at all and just pseudo-uninflected seeing-in respectively. For since trompe l’oeils not recognised as such fool the eye in deluding their perceivers to the effect that they just seem to see the objects such trompe l’oeils are mistaken for, in such cases both the identification and the motion-guiding perceptual component are mobilised with respect to what is not there to be perceived; namely, the objects for which trompe l’oeils are mistaken. Indeed, the deluded perceiver typically tries to provide grasping gestures with respect to the three-dimensional object that she also identifies, although it is not there. Neither perceptual component involves the picture’s vehicle, which therefore is not only inexperienced, but also utterly non represented. So, not even uninflected seeing-in is mobilised by such trompe l’oeils, as I said before. As to naturalistic pictures instead, insofar as they involve the experiential grasping of at least some of their design properties, their grouping properties, over and above the experiential grasping of their merely visible surface properties, the identification component affects not only the picture’s subject, but also the picture’s vehicle even with respect to its design properties. As in such cases the picture’s vehicle also is the target of the motion-guiding component, then the mental state of seeing-in that concerns naturalistic pictures is inflected seeing-in, as I said before. So again, premise 2) of the argument does not cover cases of genuine trompe l’oeils and of naturalistic pictures.
More problematically, moreover, it is not clear that unconscious pictorial vision really grants the thesis that as regards that vision the identification component is only directed at the picture’s vehicle. Thus, premise 1) of the argument has to be set aside, for it does not seem to be so empirically supported as Nanay believes. Let me explain.
As far as unconscious pictorial vision is concerned, one can rather find some evidence to the effect that the identification component also works with respect to the picture’s vehicle, precisely as in conscious pictorial vision. It has indeed been shown that eminegligent patients react to grouping properties of what they face even if they are not aware of that. This happens not only when they face some two-dimensional figure that has no pictorial value at all, namely, a mere two-dimensional geometrical figure, but also when they face some two-dimensional figure whose pictorial value can be retrieved. In the former case, it has been shown that such patients react to mere two-dimensional geometrical figures involving an optical illusion, such as the Judd illusion, pretty much as normal individuals – they bisecate the figure more on its left-hand side that at its real center – even though unlike the latter individuals they are not aware of facing one such illusory figure.​[38]​ In the latter case, it has been shown that such patients react to two-dimensional geometrical figures involving Kanizsa-items – they see a Kanizsa-item (e.g. a square) within the figure even when its contours are not physically traced – pretty much as normal individuals, even though unlike the latter individuals they are not aware of facing one such figure. So, they have an unconscious ‘ventral’ identification of what amounts to a picture’s vehicle. Moreover, in this case they are also able to grasp a figure-ground segmentation pretty much as normal individuals: they can locate the Kanizsa item in front of a background, as if such an item precisely were a three-dimensional entity. So, they also manage to unconsciously grasp the pictorial value of the two-dimensional geometrical figure they face, that is, to unconsciously see in that figure they face precisely a three-dimensional scenery, i.e., the Kanizsa item in front of a background.​[39]​ So, they have an unconscious ‘ventral’ identification also of what amounts to a picture’s subject. All in all, therefore, they manage to unconsciously identify both the picture’s vehicle – the two-dimensional geometrical figure they face – and the picture’s subject – the Kanizsa item (three-dimensionally conceived) in front of a background. Thus, they entertain a mental state of seeing-in pretty similar to the one that, factors of phenomenal awareness aside, normal individuals would entertain in the same circumstances.
This is as should be. If as regards unconscious pictorial vision, even taken for granted that the motor-guiding component merely regards the picture’s subject, the identification component merely regarded the picture’s subject, it would be hard to tell the case of unconscious pictorial vision from the case of another mental state in which unconscious vision of the vehicle prompted a mere imagination of a given subject. This latter case would involve the identification component and the motor-guiding component precisely in the above way: the former would only concern the subject while the latter would only concern the vehicle. Yet in order to grant a mental state of seeing-in, whether conscious or unconscious, a genuine perceptual character, such a state cannot amount to the mere perception of a vehicle plus the imagination of a subject.​[40]​
Moreover, this overall predicament is not astonishing as it may seem. As many have remarked from Ludwig Wittgenstein (20094) onwards, grasping certain grouping properties is basically a matter of attention.​[41]​ Attention indeed performs the very grouping operation that organises in a certain way the elements of what one is facing. Now, attention and phenomenal awareness may well come apart, not only in the obvious sense that the former may operate once the latter has already operated (as when in one’s perception one notices things one had not noticed before), but also in the other sense according to which attention may operate before that phenomenal awareness occurs.​[42]​ This is precisely what happens in the case of eminegligent patients that have no phenomenal awareness of what they are unconsciously grouping via their attention.
But if this is the case, phenomenal awareness makes no particular difference with respect to pictorial vision. That is, premise 1) of the above argument no longer holds: if conscious seeing-in is inflected, so is unconscious seeing-in. In unconsciously facing certain things, the patient involved unconsciously see items in those things as having properties whose characterisation refers to some of the design properties of those things taken in their design role, i.e., some of their grouping properties.
To be sure, it may seem bizarre to say that unconscious seeing-in is inflected. Yet this simply depends on the fact that one sticks to the standard examples of inflected seeing-in that are provided in the literature, like the aforementioned sketch by Rembrandt. For such examples involve design properties that trace back to an author’s intentional creativity.​[43]​ Yet grouping properties have to be ranked within design properties, as I have done all along. Moreover, in the cases at stake grouping properties of a vehicle are unconsciously seen as determining in their design role the properties a subject is unconsciously seen as having in that vehicle. Thus, the unconscious seeing-in that hinges on unconsciously seeing such properties is inflected.
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^1	  Wollheim allows for (quite a few, actually) non-figurative pictures. These are for him those abstract paintings that, in not allowing a figure-ground segmentation of what a perceiver sees while facing them, are not accompanied by a seeing-in experience. This is why for him seeing-in is the mark of figurativity, not of pictoriality in general. Cf. (1987:62).
^2	  Cf. Wollheim, e.g. (19802, 1987, 1998). To be sure, in those papers Wollheim also mobilises correct seeing-in, the seeing-in experience a suitable spectator has that matches the artist’s intentions as to what one has to see in the picture. Yet properly speaking correct seeing-in is what accounts for the intentionality of the picture, for the fact that a given picture is the picture of a certain subject, but not for the figurativity of the picture. Consider people whose seeing-in experience surrounding a certain picture makes them take that picture as being about a subject that is not what its author wants them to see in it. Insofar as they have such a, admittedly incorrect, seeing-in experience, those people still grasp the fact that such a picture is a figurative picture.
^3	  Definitely, genuine trompe l’oeils are quite a few; normal trompe l’oeils involve no such illusionistic effect. Yet insofar as this is the case I can put normal trompe l’oeils aside. For they allow a seeing-in experience: over and above the picture’s subject, the picture’s vehicle is seen although not attended to. In this sense, they do not constitute real counterexamples to Wollheim’s theory. Cf. on this also Hyman (2003:680). Or, if they still seem to mobilise counterexamples to such a theory, it is because they are assimilated to naturalistic pictures (on which, see immediately below).
^4	  Cf. Levinson (2005).
^5	  Cf. Newall (2011:20-32,42-3). This interpretation of seeing-in originally comes from Levinson (1998: 228). To my mind, this interpretation has a great independent advantage; namely, it can account for how the two folds of the twofold experience can have a different yet integrated content (for this problem cf. Hopkins (2010:167-8), (2012)). Yet I cannot deal with this matter here. See my Author (A, B).
^6	  For Lopes this factor as such is not the mark of figurativity, for one can recognise the picture’s subject in many other ways (for instance, by directly perceiving it). Cf. Lopes (2006).
^7	  Cf. Lopes (1996:49,137-56,174-7), (2005:24). As to how the behaviour of eminegligent subjects shows that they (albeit unconsciously) pick up the pictorial value of what they are facing on the left-hand side of their visual space, cf. e.g. Marshall & Halligan (1998).
^8	  Cf. Wollheim (1987:62).
^9	  Feagin anticipated this point: to her lights, one must tell a presentational from a representational value of a trompe l’oeil, for only when the latter occurs the trompe l’oeil counts as a picture. Cf. Feagin (1998).
^10	  For such doubts, cf. e.g. Hopkins (2004).
^11	  Cf. Lopes (2005:41), (2006:168).
^12	  Cf. Wollheim (19802:226).
^13	  Cf. Wollheim (1987:72-5).
^14	  Wollheim took naturalistic pictures as qualified by the fact that there is a reciprocity between the two folds of the seeing-in experiences surrounding them (cf. 1987:73). What he had in mind by this was probably that in the case of naturalistic pictures, there is a balance between a visual ascription of features to the picture’s subject and a visual grasping of the features of the picture’s vehicle, so that neither is visually dominant on the other. Such a reciprocity does not prevent naturalistic pictures from prompting an inflected seeing-in experience, as we will see later.
^15	  To begin with, Hopkins has some qualms with Wollheim’s notion of seeing-in. Yet his critique does not address Wollheim’s idea that seeing-in is the mark of figurativity, but rather Wollheim’s different idea that seeing-in is genuinely twofold, that is, that the seeing-in experience is really constituted by the two aforementioned folds, the configurational and the recognitional, instead of being merely described in such terms. Cf. Hopkins (2010:170). In this respect, this critique squares with Lopes’ general doubt (1996:50) that Wollheim’s seeing-in is a too generic notion in order to make the merely commonsensical claim that we normally see something in a picture more intelligible. I have tried to address such a critique in my Author (A,B). Another way of approaching the same problem consists in remarking that it is not clear how the different targets – the vehicle, the subject - of the two seeing-in folds are spatially related with each other. As Hyman notes, the best way to approach this problem is to deny that they are so related; rather, the elements of the subject are so related that some of them stands in front of some others. Yet, Hyman goes on saying, this way of putting things neglects the fact that in schematic pictures, like children sketches, only two-dimensional subjects are presented (cf. 2003:680-2). Yet this further remark seems to me ungrounded. In schematic pictures, stick figures have to be visually understood as standing in front of an indifferentiated background.
^16	  Cf. Nanay (2010).
^17	  On this risk, cf. Hopkins (2010:156).
^18	  Cf. Hopkins (2010:158). In (2010:194), Nanay gives a slightly different account of inflection, according to which inflected properties are relational properties, “design-scene properties” as he calls them; namely, properties that cannot be fully characterised without reference to both the picture’s design and the picture’s subject. For Hopkins (2010:160n.7), however, the properties he himself takes to be inflected are not those captured by Nanay’s account. For, as Nanay himself underlines, design-scene properties have to do with what in a picture’s vehicle is responsible for the emergence of a certain subject in that vehicle. Yet, as we will see soon in the text, properties responsible for emergence belong to inflected properties as defined by Hopkins.
^19	  Cf. Lopes (2005:25).
^20	  I say “standard” for the examples of inflected seeing-in I will immediately provide mobilise properties qua design properties (conceived as such) that make reference to what would be normally conceived as merely visible surface properties, such as being made of ink, being made of oil. 
^21	  Cf. Hopkins (2010:158).
^22	  Cf. Hopkins (2010:157-9).
^23	  Cf. Podro (1998:28), Lopes (2005:40,128-9).
^24	  Cf. Hopkins (2010:159).
^25	  Cf. Nanay (2010:193-8).
^26	  Grouping properties are the properties that in the tradition of the Gestalt psychology were labelled “Gestalt qualities”. Cf. von Ehrenfels (1988).
^27	  Insofar as grasping certain grouping properties also enables a certain subject to visually emerge in the picture, what is responsible for inflection may also be responsible for emergence. Pace Hopkins, therefore (cf. n.18), emergence and inflection are two strictly related phenomena.
^28	  Even though he originally allowed for contours as design properties. Cf. Lopes (1996:3).
^29	  Cf. Lopes (2005:41-2). 
^30	  To be sure, when grouping properties of a picture’s vehicle are responsible for inflection, the upshot of that inflection does not seem to be aesthethically relevant. Yet one may well draw a distinction between such properties and the properties that are responsible of standard cases of inflection, so that only the latter cases mobilise an aesthethically relevant inflection, as Nanay (2010) seems to hold.
^31	  Nanay seems to have recently acknowledged this point. Cf. (2011:470n.11)
^32	  As Nanay himself underlines (2011:473).
^33	  Cf. Nanay (2010:186), (2011).
^34	  On these points cf. e.g. Matthen (2005:300-304,310). Matthen calls the first component the descriptive component. Yet in order to set aside the question of whether the object identification such a component provides is conceptual or not, let me call it the identification component. For similar reasons, Nanay straightforwardly calls it ‘ventral perception’ (2010:200).
^35	  Cf. again Matthen (2005:304-313)
^36	  Cf. Nanay (2010:202).
^37	  Cf. Nanay (2010:201-3), (2011:466-72).
^38	  Cf. Ro & Rafal (1996).
^39	  Cf. Vuilleumier, Valenza & Landis (2001). See also Driver & Mattingley (1998).
^40	  Cf. Casati (2010).
^41	  For an explicit interpretation of Wittgenstein along these lines, cf. Chisholm (1993). The point is nowadays accepted e.g. by Raftopoulos (2011).
^42	  As Lamme (2003) stresses.
^43	  Indeed, these are the examples of aesthetically relevant inflection: cf. n. 30.
^44	  This paper has been presented in a series of conferences, Inaugural Conference on the Philosophy of Art, Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik, April 23-26 2012, Dubrovnik; ESPP 20th meeting, University of London, August 28-31, 2012, London; SIFA 20th Anniversary Conference, University of Sassari, September 12-15, 2012, Alghero; Philosophy of Perception and Aesthetics Conference, University of Antwerp, December 5-6, 2012, Antwerp. I thank all the participants for their stimulating remarks. Moreover, I thank Pietro Kobau, Giulia Martina, Bence Nanay, Elisabetta Sacchi and Enrico Terrone for their comments.
